Working Hypothesis.
Scorecard

Scorecard

Every thesis, tracked. Right or wrong.

5 open · 1 confirmed · 0 falsified
Open
OpenMar 11, 2026
The US grid is heading for a discrete capacity gap beginning in 2028
The post-OBBBA pipeline collapse is not a gradual slowdown but a concentrated step-down in 2028–2029. The pre-OBBBA pipeline burns down in 2026–2027; post-OBBBA replacement additions are blocked by FEOC supply chain constraints and the physical work test. Gas turbines cannot respond on the relevant timeline. The gap is already visible in PJM's first-ever capacity auction shortfall for 2027/2028.
Wrong if: PJM's 2028/2029 capacity auctions clear without reliability events AND clean capacity additions in 2028 come in above 60 GW
OpenMar 11, 2026
The Ratepayer Protection Pledge will fail to prevent a material PJM capacity shortfall in 2027-2028
The White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge (March 4, 2026) cannot resolve a capacity shortfall driven by timeline physics: gas turbines have 7-8 year manufacturing backlogs, PJM interconnection adds 1.75+ years on top, and solar/battery storage — the only technology deployable in time — is being actively suppressed by policy. The shortfall is already visible in PJM's first-ever missed reliability target (2027/2028 auction, 6,623 MW short) and NERC's 'high' risk classification for PJM, MISO, and ERCOT beginning 2029. The Pledge has no enforcement mechanism, no state regulatory integration, and no interaction with FERC co-location rules.
Wrong if: Gas permitting reform produces 10+ GW of new combined-cycle capacity online in PJM by mid-2027, OR the Pledge produces a concrete FERC-codified enforcement mechanism within 90 days that demonstrably stabilizes PJM capacity prices, OR AI efficiency gains reduce 2027-2028 data center demand projections by 30%+ before the shortfall materializes
OpenMar 10, 2026
The Hormuz closure is a structural break, not a historical analog — the market is using the wrong map
Three simultaneous features distinguish this crisis from every prior oil shock: no swing producer outside the disruption, an actuarial (not kinetic) closure mechanism with a quarter-scale reopening lag, and a storage countdown that converts logistics shock to upstream supply destruction past Day 25. The consensus $70 year-end price baseline is built on analogies that don't apply.
Wrong if: The Strait reopens to commercial shipping at scale before March 24, OR the DFC reinsurance backstop produces verified VLCC transits at scale by March 19, OR the IEA coordinated release suppresses Brent below $90 for 60 consecutive days
OpenFeb 14, 2025
The AI infrastructure buildout is pricing in a demand curve that doesn't exist yet
Capex is running years ahead of enterprise adoption. The gap gets papered over until it doesn't.
Wrong if: Enterprise AI spend accelerates past $200B annually by Q4 2025
OpenJan 10, 2025
The dollar's reserve currency status is being eroded faster than the market prices
The structural shift away from dollar-denominated trade settlement is real and accelerating. The market is pricing this as a long-run story. It may be a medium-run one.
Wrong if: Dollar share of global central bank reserves increases above 62% over any 12-month period
Confirmed
ConfirmedNov 20, 2024
The private credit boom ends with a liquidity crisis, not a credit event
Direct lending structures create illiquidity mismatches that won't surface until a redemption cycle hits. The consensus assumes credit quality holds. The real risk is structural.
Wrong if: Private credit AUM grows 20% year-over-year without a major redemption gate or fund suspension through 2025
Multiple private credit funds implemented redemption gates in Q1 2025. The structural liquidity risk materialized on schedule.
Falsified

No falsified theses yet.

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